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Abstract—The success of smartphones has encouraged over-
the-top service providers to seek ways in which they can have
more control over the wireless service offered to their users.
Google Project Fi is an example for this type of action, where
control over the wireless service is achieved by either deploying
own wireless infrastructure or entering into service level agree-
ments with mobile network operators. Following this example,
we construct a game theoretic model for the interaction between
mobile network operators and over-the-top service providers and
assess how the spatial distribution of mobile demand impacts
the outcomes of cooperation, unevenly affecting the utilities
achieved by the two parties. We also show how the cost of fixed
infrastructure deployed by the mobile operator, if too high, may
render cooperation between the two parties ineffective.
I. INTRODUCTION
The new technological challenge ahead for mobile network
operators (MNO) is to meet a 1000–fold increase in demand
for mobile capacity [1]. However, meeting this challenge
requires that MNOs face the hard facts of ever-increasing
infrastructure costs [2] and popularity of over-the-top services
which “extract revenue that would otherwise be generated
by the MNO from traditional voice and data services” [3].
Ensuring that mobile networks provide adequate capacity for
over-the-top services is of particular concern for over-the-top
providers (OTT), such as Google, Skype or Netflix, which
rely on mobile networks to offer their services and content to
their mobile users. Taking Google as an example, we see an
increasing push among the OTTs to assert their role in shaping
how mobile networks are accessed and deployed. The recently
announced Google Project Fi establishes a new type of a player
in the mobile market, namely one that is simultaneously an
over-the-top service provider, an infrastructure provider and a
mobile virtual operator. Subscription to Fi provides wireless
access using unlicensed WiFi infrastructure, contracted or
deployed by Google, or, if WiFi is unavailable, the cellular
network of T-Mobile or Sprint. Another example is Google
Free Zone, launched in some developing countries, which
allows mobile subscribers to access their Google social media
profile or email account without having to pay data fees to
their MNO.
The business-technological decisions OTTs, like Google,
make are changing the way mobile networks are deployed,
accessed and controlled. In this paper we analyze a simple
model of a business-technological relationship between an
OTT and an MNO. We consider that the OTT is looking for
ways to ensure a certain quality of experience to its mobile
subscribers. In order to do so the OTT has either the choice
of deploying its own radio access infrastructure, similarly to
Google’s WiFi deployments made in some Northern American
cities, or entering into a service level agreement (SLA) with
an MNO, following the Google Project Fi example. In the
former case the OTT bears full costs of the required unlicensed
radio access infrastructure, while in the latter case it pays
recurring charges to the MNO. The MNO, in turn, can invest
this additional revenue in the densification of its network, for
example, by deploying small cells.
The decisions made by both OTTs and MNOs are not
independent, as whatever the decision one party makes, it
affects the outcome observed by the other party. A natural
tool to model this type of interaction is game theory, and
cooperative game theory, in particular. In cooperative games
players typically have an incentive to enter into a cooperative
agreement, yet they may have conflicting views on the specifics
of such an agreement. In our case the OTT requires radio
access infrastructure, which the MNO already has, while the
MNO seeks additional revenues to cope with the increasing
infrastructure costs. At the same time the OTT would like
to utilize the infrastructure as cheaply as possible, while the
MNO collects revenues from the usage of its infrastructure and
charges the OTT (or its subscribers) accordingly.
Our main contributions can be summarized as follows. In
this paper we propose the aforementioned model of cooper-
ation between an OTT and MNO, for which we define the
corresponding utility space and the non-cooperative point re-
lated to the Nash equilibrium. Then, using the Nash bargaining
framework [4], we derive an analytical expression for the Nash
bargaining solution (NBS) of the corresponding game. What
we show is that the spatial distribution of mobile demand has
a significant impact on the outcome of cooperation, and that it
unevenly affects the utilities achieved by OTTs and MNOs.
Moreover, the cost of MNO’s infrastructure, if excessively
high, may render cooperation between an OTT and MNO
ineffective.
II. BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK
In [3] we have proposed a vision of future wireless net-
works that relies on virtualization and pooling (aggregation) of
resources, such as cellular base stations, frequency spectrum or
household access points, belonging to multiple infrastructure
providers to enable dynamic orchestration of wireless networks
crafted for a particular service offered by an OTT. We view
the resulting networks as service-driven, since over-the-top
services affect the way these networks are managed and
deployed [5], [6]. Indeed, an increasing volume of research
recognizes provisioning of over-the-top services as the key
feature of the next generation mobile networks: in [7] 5G
network management architecture and management interfaces
are defined to provide support for over-the-top services, while
[8] proposes a control plane architecture that supports dynamic
SLAs.
In this paper we are concerned with modelling the inter-
action between OTTs, which offer over-the-top services, and
MNOs, which provide (wireless) infrastructure. The majority
of models relevant to our work were studied in connection
with the “net neutrality” discussion. In [9] we find a summary
of various possible frameworks for the interaction between
OTTs and MNOs. These interactions can be classified based
on the pricing regime applied, i.e., one-sided, where no ad-
ditional fees are collected from service providers, or two-
sided, where service providers are charged according to the
terms of bilateral SLAs with infrastructure providers. Among
one-sided pricing models we can find the status quo model,
where best effort traffic of various OTTs is subject to traffic
engineering techniques which limit certain types of services,
for example, by blocking peer–to–peer traffic, or the strict
net neutrality model, where network operators apply non-
discriminatory traffic management, yet they cap the available
capacity on a per user basis, or the user-tiering model, where
the network operator charges users for different quality of
service (QoS) levels delivered. Two-sided pricing involves
OTTs paying either a guaranteed traffic fee corresponding
to the guaranteed QoS level (service provider-tiering model)
or a termination fee which depends on the volume of OTT
traffic that terminates in the MNO network (termination fee
model). Leaving aside the political (and business) implications,
each of these approaches has its strengths and weaknesses,
and can possibly be combined into more sophisticated pricing
schemes, for example, the channel quality-based pricing [10].
We construct our model based on two-sided pricing and service
provider-tiering. This and similar pricing schemes have been
applied widely to study the impact of regulation on the wired
networks and the Internet market (see [11]–[13]).
We model the OTT-MNO interaction using axiomatic bar-
gaining. In the axiomatic bargaining framework two players
with conflicting objectives seek to establish an agreement that
will lead to a more favourable outcome than the outcome they
would be able to achieve without negotiation. Axiomatic bar-
gaining ignores the process of negotiations of the cooperative
agreement (i.e., the bargaining process) and focuses on the
outcome of cooperation. This outcome is defined through a set
of properties (axioms) and the decisions that players make are
a direct consequence of those properties (see [4]). In practice,
that means if an OTT and MNO decide to cooperate they sign
an SLA which defines the terms of cooperation, i.e., the price
the MNO charges the OTT and the volume of OTT demand
the MNO will serve through its network. The properties of
the outcome are selected so as to represent rational terms
of cooperation, and are well-defined, for example, for the
Nash bargaining solution [4]. We should also note that our
model can be easily generalized to the case of multiple OTTs
with different services, which form a federation to provide
an integrated service. Let us note also that the OTT-MNO
interaction may also be projected onto a more conventional
relationship between an entrant MNO and incumbent MNO,
in which case the former may enter into a national roaming
agreement with the latter [14].
Axiomatic bargaining has been applied in wireless research
to date to study rate regions of interference channels [15],
dynamic spectrum access [16], resource allocation in single-
operator networks [17], resource allocation in shared networks
[18], or cooperation among wireless service providers [19].
III. OTT-MNO INTERACTION MODEL
The players in our model are the OTT (or an aggregate of
OTTs) and the MNO. The OTT has to decide whether to build
its own infrastructure or to let the MNO serve its demand.
The decision is not binary, as the OTT may decide to serve a
fraction of its demand using its own infrastructure, while the
remaining demand will be served by the MNO and is subject
to a per unit of served traffic charge decided by the MNO.
Effectively, the MNO may need to expand its network to host
the subscriber base of the OTT with the required quality, and
cover the resulting costs. The decisions made by the OTT and
MNO are coupled, i.e., the OTT will decide to serve a certain
portion of its demand through the MNO network only if the
price per traffic unit is acceptable, while the MNO will set
the price to a certain level in response to the volume of the
offloaded traffic, and considering factors, such as the costs of
deployment and operation of its own infrastructure.
A. Game model
We model the interaction between an OTT and MNO in
the following way. The OTT has to provide service to a set
of spatially distributed mobile demand points S ⊂ R2. Each
demand point is associated with some volume of demand r ∈
N, and the marked set of demand points is denoted as Sˆ =
{(s, rs)}, with the total demand (per OTT) of R =
∑
r∈Sˆ rs.
In order to provide service to its demand points the OTT may
either deploy its own radio access infrastructure (at a unit cost
co) or enter into an SLA with the MNO. In the latter case the
OTT has to pay the per traffic unit charge decided by the MNO
for the demand it decides to serve with the MNO network.
The MNO serves the OTT’s demand using the existing LTE
macrocell infrastructure, which bears no additional deployment
costs, or, if that is not possible (due to lack of coverage or
capacity), using newly deployed small cell infrastructure at a
unit cost cm. Additionally, we denoteQ as the revenue received
by the OTT from its mobile subscribers. Since in this paper
we are interested in studying the OTT-MNO interaction we
assume that Q is fixed and no further assumption about the
OTT subscribers needs to be made.
From the system’s description we formulate the game
model as follows: N = {OTT,MNO} is the set of players;
[0, 1] × [0, 1] is the action space, where θ ∈ [0, 1] is the
decision of the OTT, i.e., the fraction of the demand to be
served by its network, in case it decides to deploy its own
infrastructure (while the rest gets served by the MNO network),
and β ∈ [0, 1] is the decision of the MNO, i.e., the per
traffic unit charge (normalized as described in the following
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paragraph); and Ω =
(
uo(β, θ), um(β, θ)
)
is the utility space,
with uo(β, θ) denoting the utility obtained by the OTT and
um(β, θ) denoting the utility obtained by the MNO.
Up to now we have defined traffic-related measure rs and
various cost-related parameters, yet we have not discussed
their representation. First, we consider all of our economic
parameters to be per unit of traffic served during a certain time
frame. This means, for example, amortizing the deployment
cost of a base station over an appropriate period. This approach
allows us to construct utility functions that combine revenues
and costs related to the user traffic with the costs of base
station deployments. Second, all our economic parameters are
normalized against co, which allows us to simplify the utility
functions used and make the model independent of particular
choices of monetary values. An additional implication of this
assumption is that the traffic charge β, when normalized
against co, can be limited to [0, 1]. The rationale is as follows:
when the cost of offloading a unit of traffic is higher than the
cost of deploying a base station per unit of traffic, then the
OTT is more likely to deploy a base station than to offload
its traffic. Ultimately, the traffic can be represented as bytes,
packets, flows, etc., with the selection of the traffic unit being
independent from our model.
B. Utility space
We define uo(β, θ) as follows:
uo(β, θ) = −mo(θ, Sˆ)− β(1− θ)R +Q, (1)
wheremo(θ, Sˆ) denotes the number of base stations to be built
by the OTT, given θ and demand Sˆ. The rationale for this
expression of the utility is straight–forward – the OTT has to
pay for any new infrastructure it decides to build and/or pay
the traffic fee for the demand served by the MNO network. In
return the OTT receives revenue from its subscribers either
directly, as part of a subscription fee, or indirectly, from
customized advertising.
The MNO obtains the following utility:
um(β, θ) = −cmmm(Sˆres) + β(1 − θ)R, (2)
where mm(Sˆres) denotes the number of base stations to
be built by the MNO to serve the demand Sˆres, where
Sˆres = f(θ, Sˆ), with f : [0, 1] × (R
2,N) → (R2,N), is
the residue of the OTT’s demand not served by the OTT’s
infrastructure, which we discuss in the following paragraph.
The MNO pays all the deployment costs associated with the
deployment of additional base stations (we assume that the
existing infrastructure bears no deployment costs) required to
satisfy the residual demand, while at the same time receiving
revenue proportional to the served traffic.
The utilities of both the OTT and MNO depend on the
number of new base stations required to satisfy the demand,
i.e., mo(θ, Sˆ) and mm(Sˆres). In its generality the problem of
deploying wireless access infrastructure is a complicated one
consisting of various planning stages (see [20]) and requiring
various smart ways to find solutions to NP-hard problems (see
[21]). Since our goal is to study the relationship between an
OTT and MNO, instead of directly modelling the deployment
decisions (i.e., whether a base stations should be built in some
given location), we are interested in aggregate decisions, such
as “How many base stations are required given certain volume
of spatially distributed demand?” In other words, we seek
a mapping between the demand and a counting measure of
the number of base stations deployed to serve the demand,
i.e., mo(θ, Sˆ) and mm(Sˆres), which hereafter we will refer
to as the deployment function. We determine the deployment
function for both the OTT and MNO empirically by applying
the following procedure.
First, we generate the set of demand points S as the real-
izations of the Gauss-Poisson process [22], with the parameter
cluster probability that allows us to vary the level of clustering
in S. Subsequently, we extrapolate real-world call-detail record
information from an Irish mobile operator into a continuous
demand field, which we sample using points from S to obtain
Sˆ . Effectively, we construct a demand model with real demand
volume information and varying level of clustering, which
we control through the cluster probability. We use Sˆ to feed
an optimization model which minimizes the deployment cost,
given that θ fraction of demand Sˆ needs to be served using
OTT’s infrastructure. The outcome of the model is a set of
WiFi access points which the OTT has to deploy, and the
residual demand Sˆres, which will be offloaded to the MNO.
To find the set of new infrastructure required by the MNO to
provide coverage to Sˆres we use an optimization model which
minimizes the deployment cost, subject to covering all of Sˆres
with either new small cell or existing macrocell infrastructure
(in both cases we assume single-antenna LTE system). This
optimization model also considers the requirement that the
MNO must serve its own subscribers’ demand. Now, for each
value of cluster probability, we obtain a curve that represents
the number of base stations required as a function of θ, to
which we can fit some well-known functions. We obtained the
most satisfactory fits with the quadratic function of the form
a0 + a1θ + a2θ
2, where the coefficients vary with the cluster
probability (the obtained coefficients are given in Table I).
We will use a{0,1,2} to denote the coefficients of mo(θ, Sˆ)
and b{0,1,2} to denote the coefficients of mm(Sˆres). Since our
demand model S is stochastic, the deployment function should
be interpreted as the average number of base stations to be built
for a given clustering level of spatially distributed demand.
The point of this whole procedure was to determine a
closed-form representation for the deployment functions, such
that some level of analytical tractability is achieved. Yet, our
utility space Ω, resulting from the postulated utility functions,
is not convex. However, if correlated mixed strategies are
permitted, then the considered utility space becomes convex
[4]. An example utility space for our model is illustrated in
Fig. 1. It was obtained from drawing a convex hull over utility
pairs calculated for the action space varied over [0, 1]× [0, 1].
The point marked as NE denotes the Nash equilibrium, which
corresponds to a non-cooperative solution to our game model,
while the NBS corresponds to the cooperative solution, which
we find analytically in Sec. IV.
C. Disagreement point
In any cooperative game we need to define the disagree-
ment point, which is the point of minimal utility (payoff)























Fig. 1. The utility space for our model obtained from drawing a convex
hull over utility pairs calculated for the action space of the MNO and OTT
varied over [0, 1]× [0, 1], for a fixed clustering level and infrastructure price;
marked points denote special operating points (NE - Nash Equilibrium, NBS
- Nash Bargaining Solution); while the dashed curve corresponds to the Nash
product curve.
breaks down. Obviously, this implies that if the cooperation
provides lower payoff(s) to any one of the players, she will
not be interested in cooperating, and will settle for the minimal
utility. Often times it makes sense to choose as the disagree-
ment point, the point related to the Nash equilibrium of the
non-cooperative game. The Nash equilibrium corresponds to
a set of strategies selected by players such that no individual
player can increase her utility by unilaterally deviating.










, if a2 > 0,
argmax(uo(βNE, 0.0), uo(βNE, 1.0)), otherwise.
Proof: Let us start by observing that, given β ∈ [0, 1],
the MNO has a dominant strategy βNE = 1.0 as um(βNE, θ) ≥
um(β
′, θ) for all β′ ∈ [0, 1] and θ ∈ [0, 1]. Given the dominant
strategy of the MNO, we find the equilibrium strategy of the
OTT by maximizing its utility, which leads to strategy θNE =
R−a1
2a2
, if a2 > 0, or argmax(uo(βNE, 0.0), uo(βNE, 1.0))
otherwise, which concludes the proof of the proposition.
The pair of outcomes in the disagreement point corresponds
to the element
(
uo(βNE, θNE), um(βNE, θNE)
)
. This disagree-
ment point should be interpreted in the following way: a
rational MNO has no incentive to set any other fee than βNE,
therefore forcing an OTT to deploy either a full infrastructure
or a significant portion of it.
IV. BARGAINING SOLUTION
In the following we derive a formula that describes the
Nash bargaining solution to our game. An NBS is the unique




(ui(β, θ) − di), (3)
subject to:
ui(β, θ) ≥ di, ∀i ∈ N , (4)
β, θ ∈ [0, 1], (5)
where di = ui(βNE, θNE) for each i ∈ N . In this formulation
constraints (4) ensure that our solution is no worse than
the disagreement point, while constraint (5) ensures that the
strategies available to the players are feasible.











Proof: Given Ω, which is non-empty, compact and con-
vex, we can find the maximum of (3) by first taking the loga-
rithm of the product in (3) and then applying the Lagrangian
multiplier method:







+ ηoθ + ηmβ − γo(θ − 1)− γm(β − 1), (6)
where µi ≥ 0, ηi ≥ 0, γi ≥ 0. Then, the necessary and suf-
ficient Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) conditions for optimality
are:
∇βL(β, θ, µ, η, γ) = 0, (7)
∇θL(β, θ, µ, η, γ) = 0, (8)
µi(di − ui(β, θ)) = 0, ∀i ∈ N , (9)
−ηoθ ≤ 0,−ηmβ ≤ 0,
γo(θ − 1) ≤ 0, γm(β − 1) ≤ 0, (10)
where (7) and (8) are the stationary conditions, and (9) and
(10) are the complementary slackness conditions. After making
substitutions and calculating the derivatives, the stationary
conditions yield the following forms:
−R(θ − 1)
do − uo(β, θ)
+
R(θ − 1)
dm − um(β, θ)
− γm + ηm = 0,
(11)
a1 −Rβ + 2a2θ
do − uo(β, θ)
+
Rβ + cm(b1 + 2b2θ)
dm − um(β, θ)
− γm + ηm = 0.
(12)
When µi = 0, γi = 0, ηm = 0, and θ = 0.0, we get that
β = (Q − a0 + dm − do + cmb0)/(2R) and ηo = (2(a1 +
b1cm))/(a0−Q+ dm + do + b0cm). This solution is not only
feasible (provided that Q − a0 + dm − do + cmb0 < 2R and
Q−a0+dm−do+cmb0 ≥ 0), but it happens to lie on the Pareto
frontier of our utility space, precisely at the intersection of the
Nash product curve and the Pareto frontier of Ω, as presented
in Fig. 1. Any other feasible solutions will not lie on the Pareto
frontier of Ω, which concludes the proof.
Given Theorem 1, if the OTT and MNO cooperate, the OTT
serves all of its demand through the infrastructure provided by
the MNO and pays the traffic fee βNBS. In the following we
will analyze the impact that the spatial distribution of demand
and the infrastructure price have on this cooperation.
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Fig. 2. Utility obtained in the non-cooperative (NE) and cooperative (NBS) cases for different values of spatial clustering in the OTT’s demand, with error
bars accounting for the deviation in the number of base station required for a given cluster probability. When the cluster probability is close to 0.0, the demand
is almost uniformly distributed in space, whereas when the cluster probability approaches 1.0, the demand is generated from a number of highly concentrated
clusters. The cost cm is fixed at 1.0.
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Fig. 3. Utility obtained from the cooperation for different price points of the MNO’s infrastructure, and three values of the cluster probability p. When
cm < 1.0, the MNO’s infrastructure is cheaper than the infrastructure deployed by the OTT. When cm > 1.0, the MNO pays more for the infrastructure than
the OTT does. We see that both utilities are inversely proportional to the price of the MNO’s infrastructure; yet, there is a price point at which the cooperation
collapses to the disagreement point.
V. NUMERICAL RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
We validate our analytical solutions in Theorem 1 by
applying to problem (3) iterative optimization methods, such
as the sequential least square method. Indeed, in Fig. 2 and
Fig. 3 we can see that the numerically obtained bargaining
solutions match closely the ones expressed in closed-form,
confirming the correctness of our derivations. In Table I
we present estimates of the deployment function for various
demand clustering levels. Let us recall Property 1: given these
estimates, we can see that a2 < 0, therefore for each clustering
level the NE corresponds to the pair (βNE, θNE) = (1.0, 1.0),
which means that the OTT fully deploys (or contracts the
deployment of) its infrastructure to serve its demand. In our
numerical analysis we also assume that the revenue obtained
by the OTT, i.e., Q, is fixed and equal to the total volume of
the demand R.
In Fig. 2 we show how the utility, obtained by the OTT
(Fig. 2(a)) and MNO (Fig. 2(b)), changes with the clustering
of the OTT’s demand. What we can immediately note from
Fig. 2(a) is that the clustering of demand has a stronger impact
on the utility obtained by the OTT. This has to do with the fact
that clustering means less infrastructure is required to cover
the same volume of demand, as we can observe in the NE
case where the OTT deploys all the infrastructure on its own.
Clearly, having to deploy less infrastructure per unit of demand
makes deploying its own infrastructure a more attractive option
for the OTT. To compensate for this fact an MNO has to
decrease the traffic charge offered to the OTT, therefore giving
up on some of its profits (even though the MNO will also have
to deploy less infrastructure due to clustering of the demand).
The infrastructure cost cm has a significant impact on the
cooperation between the MNO and the OTT. In Fig. 3(a) and
Fig. 3(b) we observe that the utilities of the OTT and the MNO
are inversely proportional to the infrastructure price, i.e., the
higher the price, the lower the utility. The MNO compensates
for higher infrastructure price by imposing a higher traffic fee
on the OTT. When the price of MNO infrastructure becomes
excessive, the cooperation is no longer feasible and the only
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TABLE I. ESTIMATES OF THE DEPLOYMENT FUNCTION FOR THE OTT
AND MNO FOR VARYING LEVELS OF CLUSTERING IN DEMAND.
OTT MNO
Cluster probability Parameters {a0, a1, a2} Parameters {b0, b1, b2}
0.0 {0.1, 108.0,−12.9} {30.8, 47.8,−17.4}
0.1 {−1.1, 134.7,−53.6} {30.7, 47.9,−17.3}
0.2 {−3.0, 152.2,−84.4} {26.6, 39.9,−13.1}
0.3 {−2.0, 150.0,−80.9} {27.9, 42.3,−14.2}
0.4 {−4.3, 163.7,−100.2} {26.7, 37.1,−10.4}
0.5 {−1.3, 151.8,−88.5} {25.4, 35.5,−10.2}
0.6 {−3.7, 149.8,−88.1} {23.4, 34.0,−10.5}
0.7 {−4.6, 166.4,−109.2} {22.8, 30.1,−6.8}
0.8 {−2.4, 149.7,−81.4} {24.3, 33.4,−9.1}
0.9 {−3.5, 162.9,−99.6} {23.7, 29.9,−5.9}
1.0 {−5.0, 176.5,−129.3} {20.2, 27.9,−8.0}
reasonable solution for the players is to fall back to the
disagreement point. The level of spatial clustering in the
demand has little to no impact on the point where cooperation
collapses.
Reflecting back on the achieved results, we can note two
things. In real relationships between OTTs and MNOs, other
considerations, besides cost, may influence the OTT’s decision
of whether to deploy its own infrastructure. If the expected
monetary impact of these strategic considerations could be
quantified, it would be possible to incorporate them into our
model. On the MNO side, we do see that excessive cost of
infrastructure, which in practice includes both the deployment
and the spectrum licensing fees, may cause MNOs to be very
protective over who can use their network and how. This may
be comparable to the case of mobile virtual operators which
were able to enter the European market only after favourable
regulation was in place. However, falling revenues may be
a motivator for MNOs to actually enter into deals with OTTs,
as we can currently observe with Google Project Fi.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have analyzed a model of coopera-
tion between an OTT (or a group of OTTs) and an MNO
working together to deploy a wireless network crafted to
the needs of a service offered by the OTT. For this model
we have derived, using axiomatic bargaining, analytical terms
expressing a rational bargaining solution. Our results show
that efficient cooperation between an OTT and an MNO leads
to the MNO solely deploying the radio access infrastructure
and the OTT paying some reasonable traffic fee proportional
to the volume of its demand. This cooperation is sustainable
only if the cost of infrastructure to the MNO is not excessive.
In case it significantly exceeds the price paid by the OTT
for the infrastructure, cooperation is no longer feasible (the
MNO is no longer able to increase the charge on the OTT,
without the OTT retracting to its own deployment). In the
non-cooperative case, the OTT deploys its own unlicensed
infrastructure. Moreover, spatial clustering of the OTT demand
means less radio access infrastructure is required to cover
the same volume of demand. This means deploying its own
infrastructure becomes cheaper for the OTT, and therefore
more attractive. Effectively, it is the OTT that benefits the most
from having spatially clustered demand.
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